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Abstract 
Sweden has undertaken major national reforms of its schooling sector which, 
consequently, has been classified as one of the most decentralized ones in the 
OECD. This paper investigates the extent to which local tax base, grants, pref-
erences and structural characteristics affected local schooling resources as de-
centralization took place. We use municipal data for the period 1989–95 which 
covers the key reform years without confounding decentralization with institu-
tional changes after 1995. The main arguments against decentralization are not 
supported by our findings. First, school spending as well as teacher density is 
found to be more equally distributed across municipalities following decentrali-
zation. Second, local tax capacity does not influence schooling resources more 
in the decentralized regime than in the centralized regime. We also find that the 
form in which grants are distributed matter: Targeted grants have a significant 
positive impact on resources while general grants have not. 
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1 Introduction 
While the trend in many U S states has been to centralize school funding in or-
der to avoid inequities in school district spending, Sweden has undertaken na-
tional reforms to decentralize the responsibility and funding of the schooling 
sector to lower level government (municipalities). In 1991, the responsibility 
for compulsory and upper secondary school provision was transferred to the lo-
cal level along with a less centralized system of targeted grants to schooling. In 
1993, a major grant reform transformed the system of targeted grants into a 
general grant system. The latter reform meant a fundamental change of the or-
ganization of school funding. Cross-country comparisons undertaken after the 
implementation of these reforms rank Sweden as having one of the most decen-
tralized schooling sectors in the OECD (OECD, 1998). 
The main objectives with the Swedish reforms were to better adjust school-
ing to local conditions, increasing efficiency and accountability. This is indeed 
one of the main theoretical arguments for decentralizing public tasks to lower 
level governments (see, e g, Oates, 1972). However, as is discussed by, e g, 
Boadway & Mörk (2004), fiscal decentralization inevitably gives rise to differ-
ences in the capacity of local governments to provide public services. Given 
that there also are national objectives of equal opportunities – as in Sweden – 
some state influence may still be called for. The challenge is to accomplish this 
without unduly compromising the efficiency and accountability of public ser-
vice production. In the decentralized school setting of Sweden, pupils’ equal 
access to a high standard of compulsory education was to be fulfilled through, 
on the one hand, centrally formulated curricula and a stipulated minimum 
number of teaching hours for each subject, and, on the other hand, an ambitious 
equalizing grant program constructed to compensate local governments with 
adverse structural conditions.
1  
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate whether the reforms 
that decentralized the school organization affected local school resources and, 
if so, in what way. Two complementary measures of school resources are used 
in the analysis; per pupil spending and teacher density. We focus our analysis 
entirely on the compulsory school sector, since the objectives of efficiency and 
                                                      
1 The equalization grant system was not directed towards the schooling sector alone but towards 
all municipally provided services. IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  4 
equality of opportunities are most vital at this level, compulsory school being 
the stepping stone for further education.  
The following questions are analyzed: Did spending levels become more 
unequally distributed across municipalities in connection with the reforms? To 
what extent does the impact of local tax capacity on schooling resources differ 
before and after decentralization? This is clearly a relevant issue since, as ar-
gued above, the drawback of decentralization is the risk of creating inequalities 
in school resources and thereby different prerequisites for pupils depending on 
where they attend school. What about grants: to what extent does it matter in 
what form (general or targeted) they are distributed? This is of interest, con-
sidering that the construction of the Swedish grant system is constantly being 
changed. Finally, what is the impact of local preferences, and did it change in 
connection with the reforms? Theoretically, we would expect a more disparate 
pattern and a higher influence of local preferences in the decentralized regime, 
but the effects may be neutralized by the common curricula and the equalizing 
grants.  
Employing a panel of local government data, we study the period 1989–95.
2 
This way we cover observations from both before and after the implementation 
of the key reforms without confounding decentralization with many other mi-
nor changes in the schooling sector taking place after 1995. 
There exists only one other quantitative study of the decentralization of the 
Swedish school system: Björklund, Edin, Fredriksson & Krueger (2004). They 
investigate whether the distribution of the teacher-pupil ratio changed follow-
ing decentralization. Their primary focus is, however, on the effects of resource 
changes on student achievement.   
This paper is organized as follows: in the next section the institutional back-
ground and, specifically, the two different regimes are described. Section 3 
gives an overview of earlier empirical literature on the effects of school finance 
reforms. Section 4 presents and describes the data. This is followed by a de-
scription of the empirical setup and the ensuing results as well as some sensi-
tivity analysis in section 5. Finally, section 6 gives some concluding remarks. 
 
                                                      
2 This period coincides to a large extent with the downturn in the Swedish business cycle. We 
consider this in the analysis.  IFAU –  Effects of decentralization on school resources  5 
2 Institutional  background   
Sweden’s system for organizing compulsory schooling was for a long time one 
of the most centralized ones in the OECD. Since the national reforms of the 
early 1990s, it has been classified as being one of the most decentralized ones 
(OECD, 1998). In this section we will describe the main features of the differ-
ent school regimes. For a fuller description of the Swedish school system, see 
e g Björklund et al (2004).  
 
2.1  The centralized regime
3  
Prior to 1991, the Swedish school system was characterized by central govern-
ment regulations and controls, centrally employed teachers and school leaders, 
and a system of central government grants that were targeted to specific catego-
ries of school spending. The overriding objective was pupils’ equal access to 
education and to a certain standard of schooling irrespective of social back-
ground or place of residence. A general system of equalization grants was used 
in order to compensate municipalities with high structural costs, such as 
sparsely-populated areas, and those with less than average tax capacity.  
At the time, the county board of education assessed the local need for dif-
ferent types of resources and set the size of the grants according to detailed 
formulas. Most of the grants were then distributed directly to the schools. The 
major parts of the grants to schooling were targeted towards teaching costs 
(50 percent), costs for special education/remedial teaching and extra-curricular 
activities (25 percent), and payroll tax expenses (16 percent), see Ds 1987:1 
(only available in Swedish). The municipalities contributed with local income 
tax revenues to provide for school premises, textbooks and teaching aids, 
school lunches, school bussing, and costs for non-pedagogical staff such as 
counselors and school health services.   
The grants to teaching were determined as a function of the allocation of 
pupils across schools, the number of teaching hours per pupil, and the wage 
costs for teachers. By construction, the targeted grant system determined the 
school organization, the teacher-student ratio as well as the number of teaching 
hours. Since teachers were central government employees, local governments 
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the system for organizing and funding the school sector in Sweden prior to decentralization.  IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  6 
did not have the possibility to hire more teachers than allowed by the grants in 
order to, for example, increase teaching time or reduce class sizes. Grants were 
also to cover costs for substitute teachers, but not based on actual outlays, 
funds were allocated as a percentage of the number of teachers. To the extent 
that this amount did not cover the actual cost in a municipality, local revenues 
had to be used to cover additional hiring expenses.  
During the two years preceding decentralization, 1989–90, the municipal 
grant dependence in school funding varied between 50 to 80 percent (Svenska 
Kommunförbundet, Skolöverstyrelsen & SCB, 1990, 1991). The municipalities 
also received targeted grants to finance their other activities, such as, e g, child 
care.  
 
2.2  The decentralized regime 
 
2.2.1  The 1991 reform: shifting responsibility to the local level
4  
Gradually, public sector efficiency became an important policy objective. It 
was considered necessary to deregulate the schooling sector to make it possible 
to better adjust to local conditions. Along with a general trend of public sector 
decentralization and deregulation, this formed the basis for the school reforms.  
On January 1, 1991, the formal responsibility for compulsory, upper secondary 
and adult education was transferred from the national to the local government 
level. At the same time, teachers and school leaders became municipal employ-
ees. The role of the central government now became limited to setting the na-
tional goals to be met by the municipalities and their schools and seeing to na-
tional evaluations being performed.
5  
Equality in education standards remained an important national objective. 
The central government was still to have the overall responsibility for seeing 
that the financial prerequisites of the various municipalities were as equal as 
possible. At the same time, it was realized that the municipal responsibility 
needed to be accompanied by a local capacity to affect and allocate schooling 
resources. This was done by abolishing the various grants targeted to specific 
school costs and by introducing in its place a single lump sum grant to the local 
                                                      
4 See Ds 1990:32 (only available in Swedish) for a description of the reasons for the 1991 reform 
and the arguments behind the change in the grant system at this time. 
5 In addition, a tax reform was undertaken in 1991. The purpose of this reform was to broaden 
the tax base and to obtain lower income tax rates. IFAU –  Effects of decentralization on school resources  7 
compulsory school sector as a whole. Thus, the grant system remained targeted 
but on a less detailed level than before. The size of the new grant was to a cer-
tain extent based on the amount of grants received in the old. Thereafter, grants 
were to be adjusted according to local changes in the number of school-aged 
children.  
This change meant that the municipalities became able to allocate compul-
sory school resources as they saw fit. Also, as teachers were now municipal 
employees it became possible to adjust the teaching staff, either through reallo-
cations of existing resources or by adding local tax revenues to the grants.
6  
However, national regulations specifying the minimum amount of teaching 
time to be spent on different subjects remained.      
 
2.2.2  The 1993 grant reform 
A second step in public sector decentralization was taken only two years later 
when the overall system of central government grants was changed, something 
that consequently affected the school funding system as well. One aim of the 
reform was to make the responsibility at the local and national level, respec-
tively, more clear. The reform, which took place in 1993, replaced the system 
of targeted central government grants to all municipal services (education, 
child and elderly care, social services and infrastructure) by a general lump 
sum grant. Thereby, local governments received considerably more flexibility 
also in their school spending decisions. In connection with this reform, the 
level of the grant was reduced. To avoid inequalities in municipal spending due 
to different structural conditions across municipalities a new grant system was 
formed, compensating municipalities with unduly high cost of providing ser-
vices. Also this part of the grant system was of lump-sum character, leaving it 
up to the local governments to decide how to allocate funds between different 
municipal services. During this period (1993–95), grants from the national 
government constituted approximately 20 percent of total municipal revenues. 
Tax revenues made up approximately 50 percent.  
As another way of obtaining some degree of equality in education across 
municipalities, the national government level retained the responsibility for 
                                                      
6 However, the local income tax rate could not be adjusted upwards during most of the period 
under study due to a central government ceiling on local tax rates. Additional spending on 
schools through the use of local tax revenues could therefore mainly be implemented by reallo-
cating resources from other local services. IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  8 
formulating a common curriculum and educational goals that the local govern-
ments were to achieve. Finally, note that even after decentralization took place, 
teacher wages continued to be determined through central negotiations that 
were implemented nationwide.
7 
Another national reform that contributed to decentralization – but at the stu-
dent and parent level – was the introduction of public funding to independent 
schools. Implemented in the second half of 1992, it greatly increased the oppor-
tunities for students to choose another school – public or independent – than 
the one in the neighborhood. It also became easier to choose school in a mu-
nicipality different from the one where the student lived.
8 
Finally, it can be noted that the possibilities for municipalities to raise local 
revenues through an increase in the local income tax rate was temporarily re-
stricted through national regulations 1991 through 1994. At the same time, the 
Swedish economy plunged into a deep recession in the first half of the 1990s 
which further enhanced the financial constraints of the local governments. 
 
 
3  Empirical literature on the effects of 
school finance reforms on school 
resources 
As far as we are aware of, there is only one previous quantitative study analyz-
ing the effect of the Swedish decentralization on compulsory school resources: 
Björklund et al (2004, ch 4). Their study differs from the one in this paper in 
several ways; they focus on the teacher-pupil density alone, study a longer time 
period than we do (thereby being unable to separate the effects of the decen-
tralization from other reforms undertaken after 1995), and they treat 1993 as 
                                                      
7 The wage level was a function of seniority. The maximum level was achieved after 18-23 years 
of teaching. The wage level differed, however, between primary and secondary school teachers. 
The wage setting procedures for teachers did not allow for local and individual adjustments until 
1996. 
8 This created better financial prerequisites for, and a subsequent growth of, private schools 
which in 1991 were situated in only 33 out of 288 municipalities. In 1992, the share of students 
attending a private school (in the home municipality or in another area) varied in between 0 and 
7.8 percent across municipalities. By 1995, the private school share had increased to at most 9.6 
percent. About 40 percent of the municipalities had, however, not yet any students attending pri-
vate schools. See Ahlin (2003) for more information on the school choice reform. IFAU –  Effects of decentralization on school resources  9 
the key date in the decentralization process rather than separating between the 
1991 and 1993 reforms. Studying whether teacher resources changed in rela-
tion to the 1993 grant reform, and whether such a change affected student per-
formance (grades in the final year of compulsory school)
9, Björklund et al find 
that the median teacher/pupil ratio decreased by 1.7 percentage points during 
the period 1990/1991 to 1999/00 but rebounded somewhat in the beginning of 
the 2000s. They also find a trend of widening differences in teaching resources, 
mainly at the bottom of the distribution. Regressing teacher density on the av-
erage municipal income and comparing 2001 with the 1991–93 period, they 
conclude that decentralization seems to have had little effect on the relationship 
between schooling inputs and income but that municipalities seem to have 
changed positions in the distribution of resources over municipalities.  
Just like Sweden, Chile decentralized part of the school finance system from 
the national to the local level. In addition, Chile, just like Sweden, has under-
taken a school choice reform. Winkler & Rounds (1996) study the Chilean 
case. They compare the spending equality and cost-efficiency across rich and 
poor municipalities before and after the reform. The conclusion of their study is 
that spending inequality increased after decentralization, but that the effect on 
cost-effectiveness was ambiguous. 
The school finance reforms that otherwise have been most analyzed in the 
literature are those implemented in the U S. Since the 1970s, all U S states have 
at some point reformed the school finance system to obtain more equal spend-
ing across school districts. The background to these reforms is that many state 
courts have judged the school finance systems based on local property taxes 
unconstitutional due to the different financial prerequisites it gives for schools 
in rich (high per pupil property value) and poor (low per pupil property value) 
districts. This has forced states to undertake differently constructed reforms 
with the common denominator of increased reliance on state-level revenues to 
obtain less dispersion in district spending. Murray, Evans & Schwab (1998), 
among others, have investigated the effects of these reforms using school dis-
trict data from a selection of U S states in a fixed effect model. Using a dummy 
to capture school finance reforms, they find that the centralization of schooling 
significantly decreased the degree of dispersion in school spending across 
                                                      
9 The effect of decentralization on school resources is only of the topics discussed in Björklund et 
al. Other topics are e g equality and efficiency; skills and earnings; teacher supply and the conse-
quences of school choice. IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  10
wealthy and poor districts. Furthermore, they find that this happened through 
“leveling-up”, i e through an increase in spending in the poorest districts but 
with an unchanged spending in the richest districts. Card & Payne (1998) study 
the effect of school finance reforms on the distribution of school spending 
across low and high income districts in California. More specifically they in-
vestigate to which extent state revenues and total spending vary with family in-
come. They find that districts where the existing financing system was found 
unconstitutional tended to adopt more equalizing funding formulas over the 
1980s. But even in absence of court actions, legislatively-induced school fi-
nance reforms that reduced or eliminated flat grants and enlarged the share of 
state funding based on the districts’ ability to pay led to equalization in many 
states. However, in many states inequality in local revenues per student wid-
ened between richer and poorer districts, partially offsetting the equalizing ef-
fects of changes in state aid formulas.
10 Other studies, such as Manwaring & 
Sheffrin (1997) and Silva & Sonstelie (1995), use national level data to investi-
gate the effect of finance reforms on mean spending. While Manwaring and 
Sheffrin find that spending has risen in connection with the reforms, Silva and 
Sonstelie, concentrating on California, find that school-spending decreased. 
One problem the evaluator of the U S reforms faces, but that the Swedish 
evaluator does not, is that the reforms undertaken are very heterogeneous, 
something that has been pointed out by e g Hoxby (1998). The way districts 
and states finance schooling differs across states both before and after the re-
forms. In the Swedish system this is not problematic since all municipalities 
faced the same institutional setting both before and after the reforms and the re-
forms were homogenous across the country.   
 
 
                                                      
10 Card’s and Payne’s primary focus is on whether the reforms aiming at spending inequality had 
any effect on the distribution of performance across students of different family background. 
Their findings indicate that students with a family background of low education tend to have 
higher academic achievement if attending school in a state where the inequality in spending has 
decreased. IFAU –  Effects of decentralization on school resources  11 
4 Data   
4.1  Choice of variables 
This paper uses municipal data for the period 1989–95.
11 The reason for study-
ing this time period is that we wish to allow for differential effects in connec-
tion with the 1991 and 1993 reforms. Consistent school resource data can be 
obtained from 1989 onwards, which gives us two years of data from the cen-
tralized regime. From 1996 onwards a number of smaller institutional changes 
were undertaken.
12 Extending the time period beyond 1995 would therefore 
threaten to confound the effect of decentralization.  
We use two different definitions of municipal compulsory school resources. 
The first is total spending per pupil attending compulsory public schools in the 
municipality, excluding costs for premises and school transports.
13 
14 Our sec-
ond dependent variable is teacher density; the number of full-time teachers per 
pupil. We argue that none of these two variables is to be preferred over the 
other, but that they reflect different aspects of school resources. Note that there 
is, by definition, a link between the two measures, where teacher density times 
teacher wages is one of the components in spending per pupil.
15 
                                                      
11 We have excluded six municipalities from the data; Nyköping, Borås, and Örebro since they 
been involved in municipality splits during the studied period and therefore, are not comparable 
over time, and Gotland, Göteborg and Malmö since they handled activities that are normally the 
responsibility of a county, i e an aggregate of municipalities. 
12 For example, in 1996 the construction of the equalization grant system changed and the for-
merly centralized wage bargaining system for teachers was replaced by an individualized one. 
Furthermore, the municipalities have received further responsibilities over time, and the use of 
targeted grants has increased.  
13 Costs for premises are excluded since the principles for how to calculate these costs differs ex-
tensively over municipalities as well as over time. Costs for school transports are excluded, since 
there are no available data for 1992.  
14 Total spending per pupil is available for practically all municipalities for the period 1992–95. 
However, for 1989–91 reporting data was voluntary, and the variable is therefore missing for 
some municipalities. There may be a selection problem if the municipalities that did not report 
during these years are not random, but differ in some important aspect from those that did report. 
In order to investigate this, we have compared summary statistics for the two groups for 1992. 
Testing on the 5-percent level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the means are the same 
across the two groups. Results from these tests are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. The t-
test builds on equal variances in both groups. Comparing the distributions of variables in the two 
groups (see Figure A1 in the Appendix) we conclude that these are the same. 
15 The correlation between the two variables is 0.85. IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  12
What variables can be expected to explain differences in local school re-
sources? First, we take municipal income into account. Since it is likely that the 
form that income enters in matters
16 we control for the two types of local in-
come separately, using tax base and total intergovernmental grants (total tar-
geted and general central government grants + equalization grants), respec-
tively. 
One of the purposes of this paper is to investigate whether decentralization 
has entailed increased inequality in schooling resources across municipalities 
of different tax capacities. If this has happened, we would see an increasing, 
positive impact of the local tax base on school resources over time. Since local 
government possibilities to use tax revenues to hire teachers was introduced in 
connection with the 1991 reform (when teachers became municipal employ-
ees), we might expect the main change in the impact of tax base on teacher 
density to be visible in connection with this reform rather than from 1993 and 
ahead. Finally, given that grants were partly targeted up to the 1993 reform, we 
expect grants to have a greater impact on school spending these years than 
from 1993 onwards.  
The second type of explaining variable is motivated by one of the main ar-
guments for decentralizing publicly provided services; the assumption that lo-
cal governments have better knowledge about local preferences than the central 
government. We capture local preferences by using a political dummy indi-
cating whether the left-wing bloc has a majority in the municipal council
17, and 
by the share of inhabitants with higher education. Higher education could be 
both positively and negatively associated with stronger preferences for higher 
school spending and teacher density. Left-wing governments are typically as-
sumed to prefer a larger public sector than right-wing governments, but 
whether this is true for school resources as well can be questioned. Therefore, 
we have no prediction about the signs of the preference variables but expect 
them to matter more after the reforms than before.
 18 
                                                      
16 This hypothesis is supported by the finding in Bergström, Dahlberg & Mörk (2004), showing 
that median income has a different effect than grants on municipal labor demand. See also the 
literature discussing the flypaper effect, e g, Bailey & Connolly (1998). 
17 Even though Sweden is a multi-party system, it is standard to treat Sweden as a bipartisan sys-
tem among political scientists and economists (see, e g, Alesina, Roubini & Cohen, 1997). The 
parties can be divided into a left-wing and a right-wing bloc. 
18 The share of women in the local government, and the degree of political fragmentation are two 
other possible ways of capturing local preferences for schooling. However, neither of these was 
found to be relevant and they were therefore left out of the model.  IFAU –  Effects of decentralization on school resources  13 
The 288 Swedish municipalities vary substantially in their structural char-
acteristics, e g in terms of population density and population composition. As 
these are factors beyond municipal control, part of the grant program is in-
tended to control and compensate for cost differences arising from such struc-
tural differences. Assuming that the grant system does not succeed completely 
in this task, we include a third set of variables that measure local structural 
conditions. These are the population share of school-aged individuals, the share 
of school-aged children born abroad, and the number of households with 
school-aged children receiving welfare. We have no a-priori expectations about 
the sign of the first variable, but expect the next two to have a positive effect on 
per pupil spending and teacher density. Furthermore, the average number of 
students per school is included in the analysis.
19 We expect school size to have 
a negative impact on both school spending and teacher density because of eco-
nomics of scale. 
Finally, in order to avoid omitted-variable bias, we control for time effects 
as well as municipality-specific fixed effects. We expect the fixed effects to 
control for factors such as school competition.
20 Unfortunately, it also controls 
for municipality specific preferences that are constant over time. Definitions 
and summary statistics of the discussed variables are given in the Appendix. 
 
4.2  The development of school resources 
How have our two measures of school recourses evolved over time? This chap-
ter will take a quick look at some descriptive statistics. We are mainly in-
terested in whether something happened in 1991 when the responsibility for 
schooling was transferred to the municipalities and/or in 1993 when inter-
governmental grants underwent a large reform. Are there any indications that 
school resources became more unevenly distributed following the decentrali-
zation? If so, did this happen at the expense of poorer municipalities? 
Starting with the first question, we try to answer this by illustrating our re-
source variables using Box-whisker plots
21 and by calculating different statis-
                                                      
19 This variable captures also the population density in the municipality. 
20 Björklund et al (2004) and Skolverket (2004) both estimate fixed effects models and conclude 
that the change in private school competition has no significant effect on the change in local per 
pupil compulsory school costs. 
21 The line in the middle of the box represents the median of data. The box itself constitutes the 
interquartile range (IQR), that is, it extends from the 25
th percentile of the data to the 75
th. The 
lines emerging from the box are called the whiskers and they extend to the upper and lower adja-
 IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  14
tical measures of inequality.
22  Figure 1 presents an overview of the devel-
opment of school spending 1989–95. As can be seen from the figure, spending 
per pupil decreased when the grant system was changed in 1993. This might be 
an effect of the reduction in total grants in connection with the reform; mean 
grant dropped, in real terms, from 12 800 in 1992 to 8 000 in 1995 (2001 
prices). The variation in spending seems, if anything, to have decreased over 
time. 
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Figure 2 does the same for teacher density. If we compare the two figures we 
see that the patterns in the two measures are very much the same: the level as 
well as the variation seems to decrease over time. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
cent values. The upper adjacent value is defined as the largest data point less than or equal to the 
75
th percentile + 1.5*IQR and the lower adjacent value is defined as the smallest data point 
greater than or equal to the 25
th percentile - 1.5*IQR. Observed data points more extreme than 
the adjacent values are individually plotted. 
22 We have chosen to study a balanced panel, so that the different number of observations across 
time does not cause differences in variation. In the estimations we will use all available data and 
hence use an unbalanced panel. IFAU –  Effects of decentralization on school resources  15 
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In order to get a clearer picture we have also calculated a number of different 
statistics describing the variation in school resources and investigated how 
these have changed over time. The measures we have chosen are the coefficient 
of variation (CV), the Gini-coefficient, the Theil entropy measure, and the vari-
ance of logs.
23 Higher values on the statistics mean that spending/teacher den-
sity is more unequally distributed. The graphs in Figure 3 show that, if any-
thing, inequality of spending has decreased over time, making the municipali-
ties more similar in terms of compulsory education spending per pupil, in con-
trast to expectations. The same pattern, even more pronounced, is illustrated in 
Figure 4 for teacher density. The variation in both variables is, however, quite 
low to begin with (for example, the Gini coefficient is never higher than 0.056). 
 
                                                      
23 The coefficient of variation is calculated by dividing the standard deviation of a variable with 
its mean. For formulas of the Gini coefficient and Theil’s entropy measures see, e g, Mills & 
Zandvakili (1997). The calculations are performed in Stata SE8. IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  16
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Even if the variation in school resources did not change much in connection 
with the reforms, it could still be the case that the set of municipalities in the 
upper and the lower end of the school resource distribution shifted after re-
form.
24 Our interest is in whether inequality increased in terms of a greater gap 
in school resources between municipalities of different tax capacities. There-
fore, let us for each year relate the schooling resources in municipalities be-
longing to the 95
th percentile of the tax base distribution to those in the 5
th per-
centile. Figure 5 reports the annual development of this ratio. Contrary to what 
is typically expected, the municipalities in the lower-most part of the income 
distribution tend to have higher spending and more teachers per pupil than the 
higher-income municipalities after 1991. In fact, the spending ratio pattern re-
versed immediately following decentralization. After 1993, the low income 
municipalities still spend relatively more on schooling than the richer ones al-
though the degree of inequality has decreased (the spending ratio of rich rela-
tive to poor municipalities is closer to one). Remember, however, that these 
calculations do not control for structural conditions, which might be the reason 
for the observed pattern. In order to investigate this, we will continue with re-
gression analysis in the next section. 
 
                                                      
24 For example, Björklund et al (2004) conclude that the decentralization had the effect of chang-
ing the municipalities’ positions around in the distribution of teacher resources. IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  18
Figure 5 Ratio of compulsory school resources: municipalities in the 95
th 
percentile relative to the 5





































5  Did decentralization cause structural 
shifts in school resources? 
5.1 Model  specification  and empirical strategy 
Since our purpose is to investigate the effects of structural changes in connec-
tion with the decentralization reforms, we focus on three time periods that 
cover the two reform years; 1989–90, 1991–92, and 1993–95.  
Our approach is to estimate the following type of fixed effect interaction 
model: 
  
(1)   mt t m mt mt mt mt D D D y ε + + + + + = υ υ )δ x )δ x )δ x 3 2 1 3 2 1 ( ( (  
 
The dependent variable, ymt, denotes compulsory schooling resources in 
municipality m in year t. The vector of independent variables, x includes the 
three sets of variables described in the data section above. A year-specific ef-
fect,  t υ , as well as a municipality-specific, time-invariant effect,  m υ , is also IFAU –  Effects of decentralization on school resources  19 
included. Interaction terms are created through the dummy variables 1 D , 2 D , 
and  3 D  which equal one for the years 1989–90, 1991–92, and 1993–95, re-
spectively, and zero otherwise. Thus, the estimated parameter  1 δ  will capture 
the impact of x on school resources prior to decentralization,  2 δ  the impact af-
ter decentralizing the responsibility for schooling, and  3 δ  the impact following 
the introduction of general grants. Finally,  mt ε  is an independently and iden-
tically distributed error term with mean equal to zero and a constant variance, 
2
ε σ . We thus identify the parameters using within as well as between munici-
pality reform variations. 
Our empirical strategy for investigating whether there are structural shifts 
related to the decentralization reforms in 1991 and 1993 is to use a multi-step 
procedure. In the first step, the fully interacted model in equation (1) is esti-
mated. For each regressor in x we test whether the resulting parameter esti-
mates are equal across the three time-periods. In the second step, we estimate 
the more parsimonious model in which the parameter estimates are either equal 
across time or different across all three periods in accordance with the results 
from the preceding F-tests. The resulting parameter estimates are now tested 
for being equal across the two first and the two last periods, respectively. This 
is to account for that the key reform year might differ among the regressors. 
For example, it is reasonable to expect grants to change in impact following the 
1993 reform, rather than the 1991 reform.
25 But in the same way it could be ar-
gued that 1991 is the important year with respect to the impact of the tax base. 
Remember that it was this reform that gave municipalities discretion to in-
crease its local teaching resources for those who wished to use local tax reve-
nues for this purpose. In the third and final stage, we estimate the specification 
following from the preceding testing-procedure and build our conclusions on 
that model. The final model will hence depend on a number of pretests. Pre-
testing adds an additional element of uncertainty to most problems of statistical 
inference: the chosen significance level in the pretest matters for the final re-
sults. However, as stated by Davidson & MacKinnon (1993) there is often not 
much we can do about it. The problem should however be bore in mind.  
 
                                                      
25 Björklund et al (2004) argue, for example, that 1993 was the only relevant year for when de-
centralization took place. IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  20
5.2 Results 
In this section we present the estimation results for school spending per pupil 
and teacher density one at the time. The results from the third stage of the esti-
mation procedure described above are reported in this section (Tables 2 and 4). 
The estimated parameters of the first two steps are given in the Appendix (Ta-
bles A3 and A4).     
 
5.2.1  Per pupil spending 
Starting with per pupil spending, the test of equal parameter estimates across 
all three periods is summarized in Table 1. A p-value below 0.10 indicates that 
we can reject the null on the ten percent level.  
 
Table 1 Test of equal parameter estimates: per pupil spending 
26 
 Variable  Prob > F 
  3 2 1 δ δ δ = =  
2 1 δ δ =   3 2 δ δ =  
Tax base  0.2557
 nr    
Grants 0.0007  0.3863
 nr  0.0002 
Population share 7-15 years  0.4223
 nr    
Welfare recipients with children  0.8898
 nr    
Share school-aged children born abroad  0.0025  0.0108  0.0813 
School size  0.4492
 nr    
Left-wing majority  0.0160  0.8006
 nr  0.0134 
Population share with higher education  0.1903
 nr    
Note: 
nr denotes that we cannot reject the null of equal parameters on the ten percent 
level 
 
From the first column of the table we see that the null of equal parameters can 
be rejected for three regressors; grants, share of school-aged children born 
abroad, and left-wing majority. We thus continue by estimating the resulting, 
more restricted, model and testing the null that the parameter estimates are the 
same for the two earlier time-periods (the second column) and the two latter 
(the third column). In Table 1 we see that for the first two periods, we can re-
ject the null only for the share of school-aged children born abroad. For the lat-
                                                      
26 The results from the estimations behind Table 1 are given in Table A3 in the Appendix. IFAU –  Effects of decentralization on school resources  21 
ter period, we reject the null of equal parameters for all three variables. Hence, 
it seems like 1993 is the important reform year, as argued by Björklund et al 
(2004). We chose a preferred model in accordance with these results, i e we al-
low only the parameters for which we rejected the null to differ across time. 
Results from estimating the preferred model are given in Table 2. 
Starting with local income we see that the tax base is insignificant during 
the whole period. There is hence no evidence supporting the view that the 
richer the municipality is, the more does it spend on schooling, or that this pat-
tern has become more pronounced in connection with the decentralization of 
the school sector. Turning next to grants, we see that it has a positive and sig-
nificant effect on spending before the 1993 general grant reform, but enters in-
significantly after the reform. Since grants were targeted to school-spending 
only prior to 1993, this finding is in accordance with expectations.  
The first of the two parameters with which we attempt to capture local pref-
erences – the political bloc enjoying a majority in the local government – dif-
fers significantly over time in its impact on school spending. During the period 
with targeted grants a left-wing majority is negatively associated with school 
spending. The statistical significance is on the one percent level. In the decen-
tralized period with general grants this variable does, however, not have any 
significant impact. This is perhaps odd, since we would expect local prefer-
ences to be more important the more decentralized the system is. One ex-
planation for this result could be that the political variable exerts little variance 
over time (elections were only held in 1991 and 1994) across municipalities 
and is mainly captured by the fixed effects. Another potential explanation is 
that municipalities were not able to adjust spending as they would have liked 
due to the economic downturn. The second parameter with which we attempt to 
capture local preferences is the share of the population with higher education. 
This variable turns out to be insignificant and we can not reject the null of 
equal (zero) impact across time periods.  
Looking at the control variables we find that, in line with our expectations, a 
higher share of foreign citizens in the school-aged population tends to increase 
spending. Over the three time periods, this impact declines but remains statisti-
cally significant on a one percent level throughout. Furthermore, we find that 
the higher the share of school-aged children in the population the lower is per-
pupil spending. Likewise, the larger the average school size, the lower is 
spending. Both these associations are stable over time. That municipalities with 
larger schools tend to spend less per pupil than those with smaller schools IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  22
makes sense. For example, one could suspect that areas with a low population 
density will tend to require more schools per pupil in order to avoid unreason-
able travel times to school. 
 
Table 2 Fixed effect estimation: per pupil spending 
Variable     Estimate  
(std err) 
Tax base  1989–95  -1.642 
(3.557) 
Grants 1989–92  0.214
*** 
(0.053) 
 1993–95  0.071 
(0.049) 
Population share 7-15 years  1989–95  -1061.93
*** 
(215.58) 
Welfare recipients with children  1989–95  -2261.41 
(3665.02) 





 1991–92  324.669
*** 
(76.142) 
 1993–95  261.215
*** 
(76.763) 
School size  1989–95  -13.808
*** 
(3.758) 
Left-wing majority  1989–92  -626.203
** 
(265.039) 
 1993–95  111.504 
(273.340) 
Population share with higher education  1989–95  -151.570 
(124.973) 
Time dummies  Yes 
No of obs  1763 
R-sq:  within  0.6594 
          Between  0.3355 
          Overall  0.4514 
Note: A Hausman test rejected a random effects-model in favor of a fixed effects-
model. Standard errors are given within parenthesis. *** denotes statistical significance 
at the one percent level, ** at the five percent level, and * at the ten percent level.  
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5.2.2 Teacher  density 
Next, we have approached the teacher density variable the same way as the 
spending variable. Hence, we start by testing for equality of parameters over 
time. Table 3 presents these results. For teacher density, as opposed to per pupil 
spending, the local tax base has different effects before and after the grant-
reform of 1993. The same pattern is found for grants. In addition, both the 
share of immigrant school-aged children and the left-wing majority exert a sig-
nificantly different impact on teacher density across all three time periods. 
Hence, although similar to the results in Table 1, there are some differences in 
what constitutes the key reform year.   
 
Table 3 Tests of equal parameter estimates: teacher density 
27 
 Variable  Prob > F 
  3 2 1 δ δ δ = =  
2 1 δ δ =   3 2 δ δ =  
Tax base  0.0087  0.9804
 nr  0.0000 
Grants 0.0000  0.1095
 nr  0.0000 
Population share 7-15 years  0.2626
 nr      
Welfare recipients with children  0.4358
 nr      
Share school-aged children born abroad  0.0000  0.0055  0.0000 
School size  0.9918
 nr      
Left-wing  majority  0.0004 0.0316 0.0464 
Population share with higher education  0.2846
 nr      
Note: 




                                                      
27 The results from the estimations behind Table 3 are given in the Appendix. IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  24
Table 4 Fixed effects estimations: teacher density 
Variable   Estimate  
(std err) 
















Population share 7-15 years  1989–95  -0.168
*** 
(0.035) 
Welfare recipients with children 1989–95  -0.478 
(0.594) 





 1991–92  0.077
*** 
(0.013) 
 1993–95  0.049
*** 
(0.012) 
School size  1989–95  -0.003
*** 
(0.001) 
Left-wing majority  1989–90  -0.127
** 
(0.049) 
 1991–92  -0.046 
(0.050) 
 1993–95  0.060 
(0.045) 
Population share with higher education  1989–95  -0.063
*** 
(0.022) 
Time dummies  Yes 
No of obs  1787 
R-sq: within  0.7970 
          between  0.2690 
          overall  0.4723 
Note: A Hausman test rejected a random effects-model in favor of a fixed effects-
model. Standard errors are given within parenthesis. *** denotes statistical significance 
at the one percent level, ** at the five percent level, and * at the ten percent level.  
 
Table 4 presents the result from the preferred teacher density model. There we 
can see that the local tax base matters to a statistically significant extent after 
1993 (in the fully decentralized period) but not before. However, contrary to 
what we should expect, this impact is negative. That is, the lower the income in IFAU –  Effects of decentralization on school resources  25 
the municipality is, the higher the teacher density is, even after controlling for 
structural conditions and preferences following the 1993 reform. This is in line 
with the descriptive statistics in Figure 5. Grants seem to have a positive effect 
before the grant reform – a result that we found in our analysis of per pupil 
spending as well – but a statistically negative effect after the reform. Note, 
however, that the parameter estimates for both tax base and grants are very 
small. Although statistically significant, the economic impact thus seems to be 
negligible.  
Neither the dummy for a left-wing majority or the population share with 
higher education indicate that local preferences have had a larger impact on 
teacher density following full decentralization. In fact, the political parameter is 
negative contrary to expectations. Also the parameter for the population share 
with higher education is negative in sign. This might simply suggest that chil-
dren with highly educated parents tend to receive more support with school 
work at home, and therefore require fewer teachers per student. 
In line with the results above, a higher share of foreign citizens in the 
school-aged population tends to increase teacher density. Over the three time 
periods, this impact declines but remains statistically significant on a one per-
cent level throughout. As before, we find that the higher the share of school-
aged children in the population the smaller is teacher density with no marked 
difference over time. Likewise, the larger the average school size, the lower is 
teacher density.  
 
5.3 Sensitivity  analysis 
5.3.1  Does the economic recession matter? 
An identifying assumption in the analysis above is that there are no within mu-
nicipality differences in time trends. However, the reforms coincide with a 
deep recession with increased unemployment. It is likely that this economic 
downturn hit different municipalities different.
28 If, at the same time, the reces-
sion affected school resources as well as some of the regressors, this would 
cause a bias in the estimated parameters. We check whether this affects the es-
timates obtained in section 5.2. by including municipal unemployment as an 
additional regressor. Estimating and testing in the same way as above leads us 
to the preferred models presented in Table 6 (per pupil spending) and Table 7 
                                                      
28 Effects of the economic downturn that are homogenous across municipalities are accounted for 
by the time-effects. IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  26
(teacher density). Results from the F-tests are presented in Table 5 and the pre-
ceding estimations in Tables A5 and A6 in Appendix. 
 
Table 5 Tests of equal parameter estimates, controlling for unemployment 
29 
 Variable  Prob > F 
Per pupil spending  3 2 1 δ δ δ = =  
2 1 δ δ =   3 2 δ δ =  
Tax base  0.2469
 nr    
Grants 0.0008  0.3646
 nr  0.0003 
Population share 7-15 years  0.3767
 nr    
Welfare recipients with children  0.8967
 nr    
Share school-aged children born abroad  0.0026  0.0103  0.0843 
School size  0.4338
 nr    
Left-wing majority  0.0151  0.7998
 nr  0.0129 
Population share with higher education  0.1859
 nr    
Teacher density     
Tax base  0.0079  0.8398
 nr  0.0000 
Grants  0.0000 0.0826 0.0000 
Population share 7-15 years  0.3214
 nr    
Welfare recipients with children  0.4719
 nr    
Share school-aged children born abroad  0.0000  0.0061  0.0000 
School size  0.9612
 nr    
Left-wing  majority  0.0003 0.0281 0.0354 
Population share with higher education  0.2690
 nr    
Note: 




                                                      
29 The results from the estimations behind Table 5 are given in the Appendix. IFAU –  Effects of decentralization on school resources  27 
Table 6 Fixed effect estimation controlling for unemployment:                        
per pupil spending 
Variable     Estimate  
(std err) 
Tax base  1989–95  -1.890 
(3.577) 
Grants 1989–92  0.208
*** 
(0.0534) 
 1993–95  0.067 
(0.0488) 
Population share 7-15 years  1989–95  -1 038.23
*** 
(216.14) 
Welfare recipients with children 1989–95  -2  406.8 
(3 697.7) 
Share school-aged children born abroad  1989–90  426.21
*** 
(77.87) 
 1991–92  324.09
*** 
(76.22) 
 1993–95  261.05
*** 
(76.84) 
School size  1989–95  -13.942
*** 
(3.767) 
Left-wing majority  1989–92  -620.91
** 
(265.57) 
 1993–95  123.12 
(273.94) 
Population share with higher education  1989–95  -144.43 
(125.65) 
Unemployment 1989–95  6.194 
(80.38) 
Time dummies  Yes 
No of obs  1754 
R-sq:  within  0.6601 
          between  0.3088 
          overall  0.4474 
Note: A Hausman test rejected a random effects-model in favor of a fixed effects-
model. Standard errors are given within parenthesis. *** denotes statistical significance 
at the one percent level, ** at the five percent level, and * at the ten percent level.  
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Table 7 Fixed effects estimations, controlling for unemployment:  
teacher density 
Variable   Estimate  
(std err) 




















Population share 7-15 years  1989–95  -0.157
*** 
(0.035) 
Welfare recipients with children 1989–95  -0.411 
(0.598) 





 1991–92  0.075
*** 
(0.012) 
 1993–95  0.048
*** 
(0.012) 
School size  1989–95  -0.003
*** 
(0.001) 
Left-wing majority  1989–90  -0.146
*** 
(0.050) 
 1991–92  -0.033 
(0.051) 
 1993–95  0.068 
(0.045) 
Population share with higher education  1989–95  -0.068
*** 
(0.022) 
Unemployment 1989–95  -0.014 
(0.013) 
Time dummies  Yes 
No of obs  1780 
R-sq: within  0.7983 
         between  0.2512 
         overall  0.4632 
Note: A Hausman test rejected a random effects-model in favor of a fixed effects-
model. Standard errors are given within parenthesis. *** denotes statistical significance 
at the one percent level, ** at the five percent level, and * at the ten percent level.  IFAU –  Effects of decentralization on school resources  29 
 
Controlling for unemployment, the results remain very much the same as those 
reported for the preferred models in section 5.2. The one difference relates to 
the importance of the 1991 reform. The association between grants and teacher 
density now shows a statistically significant heterogeneity across all three peri-
ods. The effect is most prominent in the centralized period, significant positive 
during 1991–92 and negative from 1993 onwards.   
 
5.3.2  Sluggish adjustment to reforms 
Thus far we have assumed that the municipalities adjust their behavior directly 
in response to institutional changes. However, changes may take time. It is 
therefore possible that effects of the 1991-reform do not turn up in our data un-
til 1993. We check this by focusing on the two years before the first reform and 
the two years after the second reform, respectively (dropping the time period 
1991–93).
 30 The two-period version of equation (1) is given by  
 
(2)   mt t m mt mt mt mt z T T y ξ γ γ γ + + + + + = υ υ ) x ( ) x ( 3 2 2 1 1  
 
where  1 T  is a dummy for the centralized period (1989–90) and  2 T  the corre-
sponding dummy for the years after full decentralization has been implemented 
(1994–95). ztm denotes unemployment in municipality m in year t.
31 We start by 
estimating equation (2) and, for each regressor, test if  2 1 γ γ = .
32 Results from 
these tests are shown in Table 8. The results are the same as before with the 
two exceptions: Tax base has a homogenous impact on teacher density over 
time (but the p-value is 0.12 and the null is thus almost rejected at the ten per-
                                                      
30 An alternative approach would be to estimate a dynamic model. However, avoiding inconsis-
tent estimates in such a specification would require taking the first difference and instrumenting 
along the line suggested by Andersson & Hsiao (1981). Doing this, two years of observations 
will be lost. Hence, because of the data restrictions it will not be possible to estimate any parame-
ters from the centralized period. 
31 Since it is likely that differences in municipality specific time trends are even more important 
to control for in the two-period analysis, we have chosen to include local unemployment rate in 
these estimation. 
32 An alternative interpretation of what we do is that we see the reforms as one and therefore 
compare the fully centralized regime (before 1991) with the fully decentralized regime (after 
1993). IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  30
cent level) and the population share of school-aged children now shows a het-
erogeneous impact for spending per pupil.  
The estimates of the now preferred models are reported in Table 9 and Ta-
ble 10. The qualitative results for total spending per pupil are very similar to 
the three-period specification. One important difference is, however, the nega-
tive association between local tax base and school spending which is statisti-
cally significant. For teacher density grants are no longer negatively significant 
during the latter period. 
To conclude, the results from this section do not change our above conclu-
sions about the effect of decentralization in terms of a heterogeneous associa-
tion between various regressors and school resources before and after reform. 
Allowing for sluggish adjustment seems, however, to accentuate the link be-
tween tax base and school resources more, but in the opposite direction of what 
is typically expected. 
 
Table 8 Tests of equal parameter estimates, two periods 
  Prob > F 
  Per pupil spending  Teacher density 
  2 1 γ γ =   2 1 γ γ =  
Tax base  0.2325
 nr 0.1177
 nr  
Grants 0.0007  0.0000 
Population share 7-15 years  0.0429  0.0198 
Welfare recipients with children  0.6896
 nr 0.3233
 nr 
Share school-aged children born abroad  0.0016  0.0000 
School size  0.1196
 nr 0.6859
 nr 
Left-wing majority  0.0187  0.0003 




nr denotes that we cannot reject the null of equal parameters on the ten percent 
level. 
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Table 9 Fixed effects estimations, two periods: per pupil spending 
Variable     Estimate  
(st err) 





Grants 1989–90  0.208
* 
(0.110) 
 1994–95  -0.0063 
(0.0878) 
Population share 7-15 years  1989–90  -905.77
*** 
(292.61) 
 1994–95  -574.28 
(350.99) 




Share school-aged children born abroad  1989–90  320.27
*** 
(102.09) 
 1994–95  131.63 
(106.41) 





Left-wing majority  1989–90  -1 276.79
*** 
(430.19) 
 1994–95  -135.22 
(384.79) 








Time dummies  Yes 
No of obs  963 
R-sq: within  0.7015 
         between  0.2042 
         overall  0.3835 
Note: A Hausman test rejected a random effects-model in favor of a fixed effects-
model. Standard errors are given within parenthesis. *** denotes statistical significance 
at the one percent level, ** at the five percent level, and * at the ten percent level.  
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Table 10 Fixed effects estimations, two periods: teacher density 
Variable     Estimate  
(std err) 
Tax base  1989–90, 
1994–95 
-0.00394
**    
(0.00101) 
Grants 1989–90  9.12  ×10
-5***   
(1.83 ×10
-5) 
 1994–95  1.77×10
-5    
(1.45×10
-5) 
Population share 7-15 years  1989–90  -0.153
***    
(0.0479) 
  1994–95  -0.0468    
(0.0576) 




Share school-aged children born abroad  1989–90  0.0859
***  (0.0166) 
  1994–95  0.0239     
(0.0173) 
School size  1989–99, 
1994–95 
-0.00305
***    
(0.000869) 
Left-wing majority  1989–90  -0.1852
***    
(0.0705) 
 1994–95  0.0451   
(0.0636) 
Population share with higher education  1989–99, 
1994–95 






Time dummies  Yes 
No of obs  977 
R-sq: within  0.7712 
         between  0.2277 
         overall  0.3600 
Note: A Hausman test rejected a random effects-model in favor of a fixed effects-
model. Standard errors are given within parenthesis. *** denotes statistical significance 
at the one percent level, ** at the five percent level, and * at the ten percent level.  
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6  Concluding comments and discus-
sions 
In this paper, we have analyzed how the decentralization of the Swedish school 
sector affected the allocation of local school resources. Just looking at data 
over the period 1989–95, which covers observation from before and after the 
key reform years without confounding for various institutional changes after 
1995, it seems like the variation in school spending and teacher density de-
creased  following decentralization. The descriptive analysis of the Swedish 
case is thus contrary to both the U S and the Chilean evidence, but in line with 
those in Björklund et al (2004). It is also opposed to what one would have ex-
pected from basic fiscal-federalism literature. One potential explanation for the 
decreased variation could be strategic interaction; given that local politicians 
know that they will be held accountable for their decisions after the de-
centralization they may not want to deviate too much from the their neighbor-
ing municipalities. Also, the early 1990s was a period with a downturn in the 
economic business cycle. Given that the municipalities met worse economic 
conditions when grants from the central government decreased at the same time 
as they were not allowed to raise taxes, they may have been unable to increase 
spending and personnel above the minimum standards. This would mean that 
local preferences, costs and needs didn’t have the impact the municipalities 
would have liked them to have. 
Turning to the regression analysis, we start by concluding that local income 
does not seem to matter more after the decentralization than before. The local 
tax base has no effect on per pupil spending neither before, nor after the re-
forms. For teacher density the effect is insignificant up to the 1993 grant reform 
and negative thereafter. Hence, the fears that pupils attending school in low in-
come municipalities would be disadvantaged by the reforms do not seem to 
have been fulfilled. Sweden hence seems to have avoided one potential draw-
back of decentralization. Grants have a positive, significant impact before the 
reforms, but an insignificant (or even negative) impact after the reforms. These 
results are in line with Bergström et al (2004) who find that grants have a lar-
ger effect on municipal labor demand before the 1993-grant reform than after. 
Given that the central government wants to influence school resources, our re-
sults indicate that it should use targeted rather than general grants. 
It is a bit surprising that local income (grants as well as tax base) has such a 
low impact on school spending and teacher density. However, the same result IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  34
is found in several other studies: Dahlberg & Mörk (2005) find insignificant ef-
fects of grants and tax base when studying municipal labor demand over the 
period 1990–2002. Also, Bergström et al (2004) find very small effects of 
grants on municipal labor demand before as well as after the 1993-grant re-
form, studying the period 1988–95. Using survey data when estimating the in-
dividual demand for local public schooling in Sweden, also Ahlin & Johansson 
(2001) find an insignificant effect of grants. The low impact of tax base could 
be an indication of equalizing grants having succeeded in equalizing income. 
Finally, looking at local preferences we find that if anything, they matter 
less after the decentralization than before. We are, however, unwilling to draw 
any strong conclusions given the small variation in the political dummy and the 
fact that when controlling for fixed effect we capture the between-variation in 
local preferences.  
Taken together, our results indicate that not much happened when the 
school sector was decentralized. Our results thus show that it is possible to de-
centralize schooling without making municipalities more sensitive to local in-
come, given that decentralization is combined with an ambitious equalizing 
grant system and a common curriculum. It could however be the case that the 
allocation of school resources has become more efficient after the reforms. We 
hence need more research focusing on efficiency aspects to better understand 
the reforms. This is however not trivial. Studying the allocation of resources 
within the school sector could be one way of doing this. 
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Appendix 
The variables used in this paper are defined in the following way: 
 
Per pupil spending: 
Cost per pupil attending public school in the municipality, excluding costs for premises 
and school transports, SEK (2001 prices).  
Teacher density: 
Number of full-time teachers per 100 students.
33  
Tax base:  
Taxable income in the municipality, 100 SEK per capita (2001 prices). 
Grants: 
Intergovernmental grants from the central government, SEK per capita (2001 prices). 
Population share 7-15 years: 
Percent of the population older than 6 and younger than 16. 
Welfare recipients with children: 
Number of households with children on welfare, per capita. 
Share school-aged children born abroad: 
Percent foreign citizens among people aged 7–15. 
School size: 
Number of students per school. 
Left-wing majority: 
A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the social democrats and the left party have 
more than 50 percent of the votes in the municipal council. 
Population share with higher education: 
Percent of the population with tertiary level education. 
Unemployment 
Percent of the population unemployed. 
 
Summary statistics for these variables are given in Table A1. 
 
                                                      
33 The definition of full-time employees was changed in 1995. IFAU –  Effects of decentralization on school resources  39 
Table A1 Summary statistics 
   Mean St  dev  Min  Max 
Per pupil   overall  40 660  5 213.7  28 052  75 816 
spending  between    4 100.9  29 350  68 016 
  within    3 289.2  24 220  57 454 
Teacher overall  9.06 1.07 6.80 17.80 
density between    0.816  7.10  15.24 
 within    0.705  5.62  11.62 
Tax base  overall  842.20  125.7  591.0  1 7645.0 
 between    108.4  649.3  1  572.0 
 within    63.51  693.3  1  035.2 
Grants  overall  10 089  3 839.5  625.79  28 997 
  between    3 432.7  3 790.4  21 941 
 within    1  786.1  -178.09  18  296 
Population   overall  11.10  1.19  6.46  16.61 
share 7-15  between    1.14  6.64  15.47 
 within    0.374  9.71  13.62 
Welfare   overall  0.104  0.035  0.0006  0.267 
recipients   between    0.029  0.029  0.220 
with children  within    0.019  0.0004  0.171 
Share school-   overall  4.94  3.48  0  32.04 
aged children  between    3.37  0.536  30.67 
born abroad  within    0.837  1.62  10.67 
School size  overall  177.56  57.48  57.36  373.5 
 between    56.11  68.99  326.5 
 within    13.99  66.99  261.4 
Left-wing overall 0.345  0.475 0  1 
Majority between    0.415  0  1 
 within    0.232  -0.513  1.20 
Population   overall  10.48  4.42  4.45  36.29 
share with   between    4.32  5.57  32.79 
high education  within    0.910  3.53  15.09 
Unemployment overall  4.96  3.01  0.240  12.86 
 between    1.29  1.90  9.65 
 within    2.72  -0.277  10.86 
Note: The between is given by  i x , and the within counterpart by  x x x i it + − . IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  40






t-value  t P >  
Per pupil Spending   42 082  42 372  -0.5150  0.6070 
Teacher density  9.4514 9.4664 -0.1306  0.8962 
Tax  base  866.62 865.03 0.1109 0.9118 
Grants  12 913  12 602  0.6028  0.5472 
Population share 7-15  10.89  10.91  -0.1752  0.8610 
Welfare recipients with children  0.1001  0.1007  -1.7567  0.0801 
Share school-aged children born abroad  4.951  5.173  -0.5190  0.6042 
School  size  178.90 172.355  0.9328 0.3518 
Left-wing majority  0.2312  0.2364  -0.0995  0.9208 
Population share with high education 10.47  10.60  -0.2080  0.8198 
Note: Mean (not report) denotes the mean values for the municipalities that did not report figures for 1989–
91, Mean (report) denotes values for the municipalities that did. The t-test test the null that the means are 
equal for the two groups (i.e. Mean (not report) = mean (report). A p-value larger than 0.05 means that we 
cannot reject the null of equal means at the five percent level.  
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Note: 0 indicates municipalities that did not report figures for 1989–91, and 1 indicates 
municipalities that did report figures. IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  42
Table A3 Fixed effects estimation: per pupil spending
34  
Variable  Interaction term  Step I  Step II 
1989–95 


















(3.928)    
1989–95 












































(262.536)    
1989–95 



















(3949.877)    
Note: Table continues on the following page.  
 
                                                      
34 Step I: estimation of the basic specification in equation (1), p 18, from which we test whether 
the resulting parameter estimates are equal across all three time periods. Step II: estimation of the 
partially interacted model resulting from the findings in the first step. Test of whether the pa-
rameter estimates are equal in the pre-1993 period results in the preferred model reported in Ta-
ble 2. Performing a Hausman test, we rejected the random effects model as the most appropriate 
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Table A3 cont Fixed effects estimations: per pupil spending  
Variable  Interaction term  Step I  Step II 
1989–95 
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(164.169)    
Time dummies  Yes  Yes 
No of obs  1763  1763 
R-sq:  within  0.6614  0.6596 
          between  0.3729  0.3375 
          overall  0.4692  0.4527 
Note: Standard errors are given within parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at  
the one percent level, ** at the five percent level, and * at the ten percent level. 
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Table A4 Fixed effects estimations: teacher density 
35  
Variable  Interaction term  Step I  Step II 
1989–95 
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(0.638)    
Note: Table continues on the following page.  
 
 
                                                      
35 Step I: estimation of the basic specification in equation (1), p 18, from which we test whether 
the resulting parameter estimates are equal across all three time periods. Step II: estimation of the 
partially interacted model resulting from the findings in the first step. Test of whether the pa-
rameter estimates are equal in the pre-1993 period results in the preferred model reported in Ta-
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Table A4 cont Fixed effects estimation: teacher density 
Variable  Interaction term  Step I  Step II 
1989–95 
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(0.026)    
Time dummies  Yes  Yes 
No of obs  1787  1787 
R-sq:  within  0.7985  0.7974 
          between  0.2981  0.2693 
          overall  0.4998  0.4707 
Note: Standard errors are given within parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the  
one percent level, ** at the five percent level, and * at the ten percent level.  
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Table A5 Controlling for unemployment: per pupil spending
36  
Variable  Interaction term  Step I  Step II 
1989–95 





















































































(3 991.5)   
Note: Table continues on the following page.  
                                                      
36 Step I: estimation of the basic specification in equation (1), p 18, from which we test whether 
the resulting parameter estimates are equal across all three time periods. Step II: estimation of the 
partially interacted model resulting from the findings in the first step. Test of whether the pa-
rameter estimates are equal in the pre-1993 period results in the preferred model reported in Ta-
ble 2. Performing a Hausman test, we rejected the random effects model as the most appropriate 
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Table A5 cont Controlling for unemployment: per pupil spending  
Variable  Interaction term  Step I  Step II 
1989–95 






























































































Time dummies  Yes  Yes 
No of obs  1754  1754 
R-sq:  within  0.6622  0.6603  
          between  0.3471  0.3111 
          overall  0.4651  0.4487 
Note: Standard errors are given within parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at  
the one percent level, ** at the five percent level, and * at the ten percent level. 
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Table A6 Controlling for unemployment: teacher density 
37  
Variable  Interaction term  Step I  Step II 
1989–95 














































































































Note: Table continues on the following page.  
 
 
                                                      
37 Step I: estimation of the basic specification in equation (1), p 18, from which we test whether 
the resulting parameter estimates are equal across all three time periods. Step II: estimation of the 
partially interacted model resulting from the findings in the first step. Test of whether the pa-
rameter estimates are equal in the pre-1993 period results in the preferred model reported in Ta-
ble 2. Performing a Hausman test, we rejected the random effects model as the most appropriate 
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Table A6 cont Controlling for unemployment: teacher density 
    
Variable  Interaction term  Step I  Step II 
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Time dummies  Yes  Yes 
No of obs  1787  1787 
R-sq:  within  0.7993  0.7983 
          between  0.2802  0.2531 
          overall  0.4940  0.4653 
Note: Standard errors are given within parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the  
one percent level, ** at the five percent level, and * at the ten percent level.  IFAU – Effects of decentralization on school resources  50
 Table A7 Fixed effects estimations, two periods 
   
  
Variable Interaction  term 
Per pupil spend-
ing Teacher  density 
1989–90 
 
-13.579 **       
(6.893) 
-0.00243 **    
(0.0011)  Tax base 
1994–95 
 
-9.889    
(6.496) 




0.206 *    
(0.114) 
8.32×10
-5 ***    
(1.87×10
-5)  Grants 
1994–95 
 








-889.148 ***    
(301.583) 








-487.788    
(355.205) 




-764.00   
(7 595.315) 




with children  1994–95 
 
-3 613.656    
(5 884.614) 




334.500 ***    
(104.488) 








151.130   
(107.534) 




-12.234 **    
(5.575) 
-0.0029 ***    
(0.0009)  School size 
1994–95 
 
-18.935 ***    
(6.011) 




-1 201.309 ***   
(452.166) 




  1994–95 
 
-217.457    
(386.637) 




232.165   
(278.603) 
-0.0045    
(0.045)  Population share 
with higher educa-












Time dummies  Yes Yes 
No of obs  963 980 
R-sq:  within  0.7035 0.7744 
          between  0.2552 0.3117 
          overall  0.4222 0.4722 
Note: Standard errors are given within parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the  
one percent level, ** at the five percent level, and * at the ten percent level.  
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